Back in January, I did an episode on the upcoming 2024 US Presential election. That episode focused on the horse race – the likelihood of either candidate, Trump or Biden, winning the presidency and odds for each. In the preceding months, much has changed and little has changed. Yes, Trump was shot, Biden stepped down, and Harris stepped up but the polls show, as of Labor Day, a nearly dead heat between the two parties. 
We know at this point that, barring a catastrophe, either Trump or Harris will be president. We are, as mentioned last episode, at a global precipice: the war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza and the possible escalation of war between Israel and Iran, and the spectre of an invasion of Taiwan by the Chinese have all caused much pain and suffering in the world. This, combined with the steady march of environmental collapse, has driven the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to place the hands of the doomsday clock to 90 seconds from midnight, the nearest it has ever been. The clock represents how close humanity is to causing suffering to itself or the planet on a global scale. 
Suffice it to say, these are tough times. 
Unlike domestic issues, where the President has to contend with Congress or the Supreme Court, foreign policy is a realm where the Presidency is less constrained by the other branches. 
It’s true that America, by itself, cannot fix any of the above topics but it does have outsized power, both economically and militarily, and whatever foreign policies the next administration adheres to, will have impact, positively or negatively, on the world.
Before we begin, I would like to say that, as before, this is in no way an endorsement of either candidate but a way for me to gather and exam important information that I don’t think is being reported on widely enough in the mainstream meda. 
With that out of the way, let’s look at the likely foreign polices of a second Trump administration and first Harris administration. 
Trump hasn’t focused much on foreign policy on the campaign trail - his time has been spent mostly on domestic concerns like border security and the economy. If one takes Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation’s collection of policy recommendations and initiatives, as the closest thing to a Trump 2.0 blueprint, - which I do because many former Trump staffers worked on it - we can glean a lot. From an AlJazeera article from July entitled, “What could Project 2025 mean for the rest of the world?”, Lorraine Mallinder reviews some key points of the foreign policy espoused, mostly in the 900-page policy proposal called “Mandate for Leadership” 1.) “China is the project’s main defense concern. [Christopher] Miller (Trump’s former defense secretary) fears the country is “undertaking a historic military buildup”, which “could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America’s own nuclear arsenal”. While the US tackles what Project 2025 presents as Beijing’s belligerence, Miller wants US allies to “step up”, some helping it to take on China, others taking more of a lead in “dealing with threats from Russia in Europe, Iran, the Middle East, and North Korea”. 2). Project 2025 wants the US to “modernize, adapt, and expand its nuclear arsenal”. “All US nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement,” Miller says in the Mandate for Leadership. Under Project 2025, nuclear production would be bulked up. Among other things, this would involve accelerating the “development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile”. It would also involve testing nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site – in defiance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, of which the US is a signatory.” 
The nuclear question was laid out nicely in a recent Washington Post article entitled “Nuclear proliferation will dominate the next president’s agenda” by Henry Sokolski. He writes, ”Last week, the House Intelligence Committee chairman volunteered that Iran could declare itself a nuclear weapons state by the end of the year. And earlier this month, the U.S. intelligence community warned that Iran has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.’’ How quickly? Experts now say 12 weeks or less.”
It's interesting to note that in her book, There is Nothing for You Here, Fiona Hill, an advisor to Trump on matters with Russia, notes Trump’s inconsistency and lack of seriousness on nearly every policy. The one exception seems to be his fear of the use of nuclear weapons, which she implies was consistent during her time in the Trump administration. Will that fear continue or will the Trump 2.0 administration take escalatory measures to retain, if not nuclear supremacy, at least parity? 
In a Foreign Policy article from earlier this month entitled, “Trump’s Foreign-Policy Influencers”, the FP Staff examines the profiles of 11 men who are likely to play significant roles in foreign policy decisions in the next Trump administration. Of the ones where China is mentioned in their profiles, all of them, in one form or another, appear hostile. Eldrige Colby, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense in the last administration, has a typical profile in this regard:  “If he gets another shot in a future Trump administration—and his name has been floated for another defense position or even a job with the National Security Council—he would hammer home his overarching point: China, not Russia, is America’s biggest problem. In a series of articles, books, and speeches, Colby has for years made the case for the United States to use its limited defense resources to prevent a hostile hegemonic power from gaining ascendancy over the Asia-Pacific region. China has already economically cowed many of its smaller neighbors, and it continues to chip away at regional security in places such as the South China Sea. But Taiwan is the real test: A Chinese effort to reincorporate the island by force would mean a conflict with the United States and likely Japan—and, if successful, would open China up to domination of the entire Pacific Basin, the world’s most important economic region by far. Colby’s ideas are a timely reprisal of one of the original blueprints of U.S. grand strategy, written by Nicholas Spykman in the middle of World War II, but turned on its head: Asia, not Europe, is now the economic and political center of gravity of the world, and its domination by Beijing would severely constrain America’s future prospects and freedom of action. One problem for Colby is that his potential future boss, while willing to be plenty hostile to China at times, is also utterly transactional, and Trump has already signaled his willingness to barter away Taiwan’s autonomy. Realist hawks such as Colby tend to sit uncomfortably with a foreign policy that has no true north…Lawmakers may not buy an Asia-only defense strategy anyway, in a future Trump administration or a future Kamala Harris one. A congressionally mandated defense review panel argued in July that the United States should prepare to defend its vital interests in both Europe and Asia.”
While the power of the purse rests with Congress, difficult decisions may have to, at some dark in the not too distant future, be made. As noted in previous episodes, high economic growth almost always occurs alongside population growth – slowing population growth means an aging population and an aging population means additional healthcare spending. According to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Over 2023-32 average NHE growth (5.6 percent) is projected to outpace that of average GDP growth (4.3 percent), resulting in an increase in the health spending share of GDP from 17.3 percent in 2022 to 19.7 percent in 2032.”
Will America be able to do it all – continue to pay on its past debt, continue to pay the highest healthcare costs in the developed world, and pay for the largest military in the world? 
Trump has hinted at finding savings by cutting costs. 
From an All Things Considered article from July, Franco Ordonez writes, “From the campaign trail, Trump’s raised concerns that the U.S. is paying too much to support Ukraine.
He’s promised again to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accords.
And he has floated the idea of a 10% tax on imports from all countries and a much higher tax on China, echoing at rallies that “China is eating our lunch,” to groans and applause.”
In Europe, there is concern. Writing in an article for the European Council on Foreign Relations entitled, “Imagining Trump 2.0: Six scary policy scenarios for a second term”, writers Celia Belin, Majda Ruge, and Jeremy Shapiro note that, “Europeans are still licking their wounds from Trump’s first term: they have not forgotten the former president’s tariffs, his deep antagonism towards the European Union and Germany, or the US withdrawal from the Paris climate accords and the Iran nuclear deal. Nor have they recovered from Trump’s general boorishness at international summits, not to mention his regular threats to withdraw from NATO. Beyond these flashbacks, Europeans are predominantly worried about the security implications of a second Trump presidency. Trump’s renewed threat to withdraw from NATO, his encouragement of Russian attacks on “delinquent” NATO members, and his claim that he could resolve the war in Ukraine in 24 hours take on even more resonance against the backdrop of Russia’s aggression. The fact that the nations of Europe cannot defend themselves without resorting to NATO and the help of the United States has never been more obvious; and yet, it has never been less certain that the US commitment to European security will remain firm. But if Trump is elected, the implications for Europe will go well beyond the issues of Ukraine and European security. The Trump administration will challenge European policymakers across a range of issues: from China to trade, climate to the Middle East. Worse, another nightmare lurks beneath the potential foreign policy shocks: an international coalition that could emerge as a framework for populists in Europe to establish special ties with Trump’s Washington. Trump’s re-election might well embolden the populist right in Europe to obstruct common EU policies and initiatives more forcefully.”
The war in Ukraine is fluid and it’s impossible to say yet how it will end. Yet, with the incursion into Kursk, it appears to have entered a new stage. Writing in CNN, Nick Patton Walsh examines the timing and likely reasons for the incursion, “ So why this high-risk move now? If we look beyond the immediate positive news cycle for President Volodymyr Zelensky, other goals emerge. For the first time in the war, talk of talks has begun. Russia may be invited to attend the next peace conference held by Ukraine and its allies. The proportion of Ukrainians who approve of negotiations, while a minority, is marginally growing. And the possibility of a Trump presidency is glowering above Kyiv.
US Vice President Kamala Harris may retain the same steadfastness as President Joe Biden over Ukraine. But it is important to remember that Western foreign policy is a fickle and easily exhausted beast. NATO’s persistent backing for Ukraine is an outlier. And as the war edges towards its fourth year, questions about how this ends will grow louder.”
This mirrors the growing American dissatisfaction with the amount of money spent on the war. Per Pew research, from March 2022 to April 2024, the number of Americans who believe we are spending too much in aid for Ukraine has gone from 7% to 31%. It is split among party lines, with the Democrats less likely to believe this than Republicans but, even there, the increase has been roughly 3X. 
This has been, by most estimates, a rough year for the Ukrainians. If peace talks do move forward, the timing here will be interesting. Certainly, if they are reached before November, Harris (and by extension, Joe Biden) would receive some amount of credit if, for nothing else, not passing on a foreign policy crisis to the next administration (even if that happens to be Harris’). However, if Trump is elected it’s one less issue he has to deal with. 
Another concern, of course, is Taiwan. Per an article in NikkeiAsia entitled, “Would a Trump presidency change China’s calculations on Taiwan?”, Ken Moriyasu and Ryohtaroh Satoh write, “In Taiwan, a comment made by Trump in a July 2023 interview with Fox News still lingers in the minds of many observers.
When asked by anchor Maria Bartiromo whether the U.S., under a potential second Trump presidency, would protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression, even if it meant going to war with China, the Republican former president did not give a direct answer.
"I don't want to say it because if I'm in the position of president, I don't want to say what I'm thinking," he replied.
"If I answer that question, it will put me in a very bad negotiating position," Trump said. "With that being said, Taiwan did take all of our chip business. We used to make our own chips. Now they're made in Taiwan."
"We should have stopped them," he added. "We should have taxed them. We should have tariffed them."
Pan Chao-Min, a political scientist at Taiwan's Tunghai University, told Nikkei that in a Trump presidency, criticism of Taiwan's chip industry is likely to intensify. Trump's Taiwan policy is "based on 'America First,' American interests and even personal electoral interests," Pan said, adding that he fears Taiwan may be used as a quid pro quo for an agreement with China.”
Before we go on to what a Harris foreign policy may look like, a word from our sponsor.
Summing up what a Harris foreign policy may look like, writing in Politico, Eric Bazail-Eimil, Joe Gould, Miles J. Herzenhorn, and Phelim Kine, note that, “In most areas, Harris would likely continue many of President Joe Biden’s foreign policy objectives. A Harris administration would probably offer strong support for Ukraine’s war effort, and continue initiatives to deepen alliances in Asia and the Pacific in the face of China’s geopolitical ascendance. And she would likely still see the U.S. provide robust support to Israel and other allies in the Middle East. 
But regarding Israel’s war on Hamas, Harris has sounded more sympathetic to the plight of Palestinians, a stance that could mollify Arab-American voters and others who are troubled by Biden’s support for Israel’s war effort in Gaza.”
At her acceptance speech for the Democratic Nomination for president, she seemed to seek more middle ground than her predecessor. This is how NBC reported her speech: 	"Let me be clear, I will always stand up for Israel’s right to defend itself, and I will always ensure Israel has the ability to defend itself, because the people of Israel must never again face the horror that a terrorist organization called Hamas caused on Oct. 7, including unspeakable sexual violence and the massacre of young people at a music festival," Harris said.
She continued: "At the same time, what has happened in Gaza over the past 10 months is devastating. So many innocent lives lost. Desperate, hungry people fleeing for safety, over and over again. The scale of suffering is heartbreaking."
Harris said she and Biden are working to end the war in Gaza so that "Israel is secure" and the hostages are released and that "the suffering in Gaza ends and the Palestinian people can realize their right to dignity, security, freedom and self-determination."
On China, there seems to be less daylight between the two candidates. From the earlier cited Politico article: Harris would likely continue the Biden administration’s tough policy on China if elected president.
As a senator, she criticized Trump’s approach to Beijing, telling Vice President Mike Pence during the vice-presidential debate in 2020 that Trump “lost that trade war” and that his tariffs hurt the American economy without rebalancing the U.S.-China relationship. But like other administration officials, Harris has advocated for “de-risking” from Beijing, a policy that encourages reducing the extent to which Western economies depend on China.
“It’s not about pulling out, but it is about ensuring that we are protecting American interests, and that we are a leader in terms of the rules of the road, as opposed to following others’ rules,” Harris said in an interview with CBS last year.
Harris has also been outspoken on sensitive issues roiling the U.S.-China relationship. She regularly worked on legislation as a senator promoting human rights in Hong Kong. Trump signed into law a bipartisan bill she introduced with Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) promoting human rights in Hong Kong and sanctioning Hong Kong officials implicated in “undermining fundamental freedoms and autonomy” in the territory. A year later Harris’ co-sponsorship of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act helped make it law in 2020 and empowered the U.S. government to impose sanctions against “foreign individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses” in Xinjiang.
One place where Harris may break from Biden is on Taiwan. Per an article from The Diplomat, Will a Kamala Harris Administration Continue Biden’s Greater Clarity on Taiwan?, Dean P. Chen writes, “Harris gave only a vague reply when asked about Taiwan in a press gaggle during her September 2022 tour of the USS Howard at Japan’s Yokosuka Base. Her remarks were all the more striking coming only days after Biden’s CBS interview in which he reiterated the United States’ rock-solid support for Taiwan and pledged military interventions in a Taiwan Strait contingency. 
In her address aboard the U.S. naval ship in Japan, the vice president criticized Beijing’s intimidating and coercive behaviors across the East China and South China Seas while emphasizing that “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is an essential feature of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” She emphasized, “We will continue to oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. And we will continue to support Taiwan’s self-defense, consistent with our longstanding policy.” 
Harris added, “Taiwan is a vibrant democracy that contributes to the global good, from technology to health and beyond, and the United States will continue to deepen our unofficial ties.” All of that showed no daylight between her and the Biden White House’s articulations about Taiwan. 
Yet, notably, Harris did not elaborate regarding how the U.S. would respond to a cross-strait crisis. When asked about the president’s recent promise to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan, Harris answered in an intricate way, saying that “the relationship and the alliance is based on shared principles in terms of international rules and norms, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity. It is also about what we know to be our commitment to security and prosperity for all these nations.”
Per a 2023 essay from the Council on Foreign Relations titled “Taiwan Announced a Record Defense Budget: But Is It Enough to Defer China?”, writer David Sacks states, “While Beijing continues to assert a preference for achieving unification through peaceful means, it has embarked on a remarkable military modernization campaign, and preparing for a war in the Taiwan Strait has been the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) top priority. CIA Director William Burns has noted that the United States knows “as a matter of intelligence” that Xi has ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. China’s official defense budget is now $224 billion, nearly 12 times Taiwan’s defense spending. China has developed an array of capabilities intended to win a war in the Taiwan Strait—principally ballistic missiles, submarines, modern air defense units stationed on China’s east coast and reclaimed land in the South China Sea that can range beyond Taiwan, and advanced fighters and long-range bombers.”
The title of the Business Insider article from 2023 says it all “There is 'no situation' where Taiwan can defend itself against China the way Ukraine has fought against Russia, says APAC security expert”.
In my opinion, Taiwan and climate change will be the most important international issues for the next president, whoever they are. 
On climate, we do not know exactly what Harris’ position will be. Per a recent article from CBS News, reporter Mary Cunningham writes, “The Democratic Party devoted seven pages of its 90-page 2024 platform to climate policy, offering a few clues about what Vice President Kamala Harris could do to combat climate change if she wins the presidency. 
Harris, who only emerged as her party's nominee in mid-July after President Biden dropped out of the race, has not yet articulated her own climate policy. The topic was scarcely mentioned at the Democratic convention this week, making the party platform the only guide to what climate policy in a Harris White House might be.
During her nearly 40-minute long address at the Democratic National Convention on Thursday night, she talked about the economy, the war in Gaza, and immigration, but made just one brief reference to the issue in outlining the "fundamental freedoms" at stake in this election — "the freedom to breathe clean air, drink clean water, and live free from the pollution that fuels the climate crisis."
Stevie O'Hanlon, a spokesperson for The Sunrise Movement, a youth-led climate group, said that Harris' decision not to speak more forcefully on climate change – both at the DNC and leading up to it – was a "missed opportunity."
With fracking being such a sensitive topic in battleground state Pennsylvania, it’s doubtful that we will hear more about Harris’ climate policies, lest they become a political liability.
It’s important to note that, even if Harris wanted expansive climate policies, she would have to go through Congress to fund them. There may be additional Executive Actions that are within the purview of the president but most policies of real substance would have to be enacted as laws.
Yet, if the US is going to meet its agreement under the Paris Agreement, more needs to be done, despite the progress made under the Inflation Reduction Act. Per an NPR article from last year, “And even if everything goes right, it still won't be enough to deliver on a pledge the U.S. made under the 2015 Paris Agreement to cut its emissions in half by the end of this decade. Meeting that target will require even more aggressive actions by states and the federal government, Rhodium Group says.”
Given the hard budget choices that may be forthcoming, and the possibility of a divided Congress, it’s unlikely that additional programs will be funded, especially in the near future. 
So where does this leave us? Trump is likely to reduce any climate commitments at the federal level, should he be reelected. What that would mean is actually unclear. If the Republican party controls Congress, they could zero out the spending that has been allocated to the IRA and this would (obviously) reduce its impact. They could do the same with federal appointments at the EPA and could change or disregard pollution laws and control enforcement. 
What they will have a harder time doing is controlling private actors and states and local municipalities, which will increasingly move to mitigate the damage done by excess carbon in the atmosphere. This could be done through a direct carbon tax or congestion pricing (as seen recently in New York City [though it was postponed before going into effect]). Businesses rely on stability – it’s also possible that many have already incorporated the extra cost of meeting the higher standards into their costs of doing business.
Harris signaled in her speech a move to the middle – I see, similar to what Biden did with the Affordable Care Act, something approaching an addendum and not a leap forward – there will be tweaking around the edges but I don’t see Harris going forward with anything approaching the Green New Deal in her administration. 
Taiwan is tricky. Neither candidate has been as clear as I would like them to be on this issue. A war with China over Taiwan would be the biggest conflict between major powers since the end of the second world war and could lead to the third. There is probably something to be said for Trump’s desire to remain ambiguous – war planning is difficult at its best and not knowing if America would enter the war or not would drive the Chinese to at least reconsider their actions. 
I would still like the candidate to be questioned on this topic if, for nothing else, to see if they understand the consequences of either choice – to fight for Taiwan or to live in a world where China has supremacy over this part of the world.
Thank you for listening to this episode of Elegant Ramblings. If you’ve enjoyed what you’ve heard, please consider liking and subscribing to the channel on iTunes or YouTube. You’ll be able to find show notes there. Hope you enjoyed. Bye for now.