Augusta DellÕOmo: Welcome to Right Rising, a podcast from the Center for the Analysis of the Radical Right. I'm your host Augusta DellÕOmo. Today I'm joined by Dr. Will Allchorn is the Associate Director of the Center for the Analysis with the Radical Right, and a postdoctoral researcher at University of Leeds. He's here with us today to introduce CARR and give us some context for understanding the radical right. Will, thanks for being here.

Dr. Will Allchorn: Thanks for asking me on Augusta, it's good to be here. Thanks.

AD: So I wanted to start with big questions, because many of our listeners may not be familiar with the Center, and as this is our first episode, where did the idea of CARR come from and what is the organization's overall mission and goals?

WA: Great. Yeah. So we kind of formed the idea for the Center in late 2017. And it was a collaboration between myself and Professor Matthew Feldman. At the time, we've already discussed the idea of putting together kind of a network of academic researchers studying in the field of far right studies, and both in the UK but also internationally, but it felt quite an auspicious time to start a center. Specifically, that moment of the Trump elections, in the UK the referendum, we suddenly saw a lot of these movements, which have largely been at the fringes of politics, both in the US but also in the UK in the European context, kind of emerging as more mainstream actors and almost being emboldened by and some of the leaders who are in power and having this kind of more liberal authoritarian streak to them. 

It piqued our interest and it felt rights to lead a Center. And I guess it's kind of the USP of CARR, which is a bit more public facing, and trying to bring the expertise of academics and practitioners in, in a more public way on some of the issues emerging from this moment of shifting towards and the mainstreaming of specific ideas within the constellation of far right ideology. And so yeah, so set out in a educational modes, at the start and to promote better understanding of the radical right globally. We are quite keen to push the boundaries of the concept beyond and the global North. We've done this with ÒInsight Blogs,Ó which publish every day almost, as well as through collaborations with Third Sector and other research organizations. We tried to aim for as much of topical and emerging issues as possible. So more recently, we've published reports, or we call research insights and papers, looking at things like eco-fascism, but also things like the emotional aspects of right-wing populism, trying to give a bit more of an in-depth look that perhaps blogs can't fill.

We've been going for three years now, and it's been really great to see how much attention some of the blogs have been getting, and also when we've been able to partner with outside organizations, some e quite cool collaborations in trying unpack what we mean by Òfar-right extremism,Ó and if there's any kind of interventions that we can help develop, or aid through kind of robust, systematic research on the topic. So thatÕs a quick overview of how we started and where we're at into of our mission - our missions changed a bit in the past year or so from presenting knowledge in an accessible way, towards producing it. With that ÒResearch InsightsÓ series, and we've also got an ongoing project with Hedayah, which is a center of international excellence on counterterrorism interventions, looking at one of the first major projects on far-right counter-narratives, producing some reports and guides that might be useful for practitioners and NGOs who are active in that space. That's broad contours of what we've been doing for the past four years.

AD: I think that sets out really well particularly some of the aspects of CARR that I most appreciate as a scholar, it truly is a global network of fellows. I've connected with people, and collaborated with people who work in Latin America and Asia, and Southeast Asia and Australia. A lot of times the content that we see about the far right is very domestically focused, it's really focused on the national context of these organizations. CARR is really creating a global forum for us to share our research and talk about the ways that these groups are creating a robust and violent exchange across the globe. So I think that you highlighted that really well. You mentioned a few of these, but what are some of the key highlights and projects that CARR has been working on, and as you said, there's kind of a shift in the organization's direction. So can you tell us what kinds of collaborations the organization is looking for going forward?

WA: We had our first major projects, the first inaugural conference that we had last May in London, which was really interesting forum where we had traditional academic papers and presentations. We had keynotes from one of our patrons, Professor Cas Mudde, and as well as also keynotes by Cynthia Miller-Idriss and Mark Potok who are fellows at the Center. That was a really interesting exchange because we had that more academic focus, we also had panels and speakers of people who were involved at more policy level. So we had some people from the Southern Poverty Law Center, coming to speak to us, we have some former far extremists talking about their entry and exit from the far right, as well as a panel with some people from Advertising, as well as the Home Office who are involved in analyzing and constructing interventions to counter some of the messages by far-right groups in the UK. We've had a couple events as well as the ongoing webinar series looking at best practice in terms of far-right de-radicalization, which has been, again a good mixture, a good blend of both academics and policy facing individuals.

We've had a couple of reports which have been picked up, at least in the UK press around - the first one was around slogans, slurs, and symbols of the far-right which hopefully be a useful bank of information for mainly tech platforms. I think we've got another one due out shortly, which looks different definitions of far extremism and they're like a panoramic overview of some of the f main influences and actors on the global far-right scene. That's kind of a blend of some stuff which is coming forward and some stuff which weÕve already done.

Another key project which follows on from this tie up, mentioned with Hedayah, is a six-month following project where we're hoping to rigorously test some of the counter-narrative material that we've been developing for the Counter-narratives Project with people who might leaning towards these groups, but also because there is a lack of empirical evidence when it comes to
Counter-narratives which have been used more generally, and more specifically, towards more jihadi extremist leaning audiences, and very little in terms of the far right. This methodology hasn't been as widely applied to far-right leaning audiences, so hopefully some interesting insights coming out from that in the following year. 

AD: Thanks for that Will and I think that's a really great overview of all of the work that CARR is doing. I particularly like the point that you emphasize, which I think is a draw for all of us who study the radical right, is the disproportionate study of far right groups as opposed to Jihadi extremist groups that the amount of money and research really doesn't go - at least until recently - towards studying far right extremists. That's one of the things that I know drew me to this topic. So shifting gears a little bit to your personal background, how did you become interested in researching and studying the radical right?

WA: Yeah, thanks Augusta for that question. I've been studying far mainly in the UK, but also in in Western Europe, for the past 10 years or so. I started becoming interesting in this topic, mainly because in the UK at least, we had the rise of a neo-fascist party called the British National Party. Party. What was interesting there is that throughout its early history, it wasn't a very successful party. It was largely on the fringes. It was only really in the 2000s that we saw it rise as a party, mainly because of the leadership of Nick Griffin, and becoming Chairman of the party in 1999. What I found interesting about that case study was we saw a shift away from this more biologically racist and anti-Semitic leaning focus. Obviously in that post 9/11 security environment, towards targeting government policies and f targeting the Muslim population and the shift towards taking a more anti-Islam or anti-Muslim stances as well as touching that to a broader program of right wing populism. 

They also positioned themselves as the authentic, outsider protest and party within Britain's electoral system. We see this also in the Greek case with Golden Dawn in Greece, which is, again another neo-Nazi, neo-Fascist party. In the early 2010s, it was doing a similar thing that the BNP did in terms placing itself as that authentic opposing party to the mainstream. I guess this is before the moment that we're currently in, where we have at least the politics, not necessarily the parties of the far right in power, that was when they were able to mobilize some discontents about the mainstream in order to rise electorally. The party at its zenith, and this was around the time that I was starting to write my Masters (or just after actually master thesis), in 2010, they managed to chalk up some of the highest electoral results in the UK for a far-right party, scoring about half a million votes in that 2010 election - not winning any seats or breaking through and only really at European Parliament level. 

This is just a very long introduction: what I did based on that was some interviews with MPs who had been in constituencies where this party had been doing particularly well, and trying to speak to them about what electoral strategies - or counter strategies probably a better way to term it - that they used in relation to this party. What was quite interesting there was that you still saw a blend of more anti-racist stance of no-platforming. But they also had some people who were also trying to examine what were the kind of grievances that these parties were trying to mobilize on. There's always this debates in the literature about whether you should reject or adopt these grievances within these responses, so that was my initial introduction to the topic.

Then I did my PhD a bit more of a shift towards more street-based protests, which is becoming more of an issue in the UK after the fall of the BMP quickly after that 2010 result. Again, I interviewed a larger sample of policymakers both politicians, policymakers, police officers as well as behind the scenes council officials in areas where the English Defense League and then lastly, Britain First led to these anti-Islamic street protest movements mobilized. The idea in my mind was talked about by Karl Popper is this idea of to what extent do we tolerate extremist or intolerant actors and so is what got me started in terms of trying to understand this topic is how the mainstream reacts. I guess we've seen a flip in recent years towards these parties becoming the mainstream so it's a fairly interesting switch that we've seen over the past 10 years.

AD: I completely agree and I think that's been one of the most fascinating aspects of my own work is that symbiotic relationship between what we as scholars would classify, as the far right and the actual process of mainstreaming the far right and the difficulties that we face as researchers of wanting to understand how these groups form, but also not wanting to amplify or elevate their grievances, if you want to use that word, which in many cases are based on, as you said, racist, xenophobic assumptions. So that tension for scholars is always really present. I wanted to ask you, from your research, and I think for many of our listeners, this could be their first entry into the far right and understanding how these organizations work. We're going to focus on a lot of different kinds of far right groups on this podcast. But what do you think are some key areas of focus for understanding the radical right?

WA: I think one of the interesting things I've found from studying far-right social movements is that actually a lot of people come to these movements with very non-ideological motivations. Going back to that example of the English Defence League, sociologist called Hilary Pilkington, who did a lot of ethnographic work with the activists there, what draws them to these movements was perhaps a sense of belonging or sense of family and also attached to that some grievances about being rejected from mainstream politics or mainstream political activism. I think it's important to look at those social drivers in terms of what we should be focusing on, I know that there'll be probably lots of people who will pile in on me and say that ideology is actually the most important thing, but I think that kind of comes after and is used as a way of understanding or making sense of some of these kind of grievances. 

Another one which is interesting to stress in terms of the far right, is the difference between the front-facing and back-facing discourses because a lot of these groups have become very good and professionalized at presenting themselves, in what they perceive as legitimate light. Its always interesting when we're analyzing, we're trying to understand the radical right, and try to compare what their front-facing discourse - what they say to public actors - versus what they say internally. I think there's some really interesting analysis to be to be done. Often the back-facing discourse is far more extreme, going back to that case study of Golden Dawn. If you witness any of rallies or internal conversations, there was this cult around the leader of the party, almost as some very weird neo-Nazi frictions going-on. I think it's always good to bear those in mind. I know that Matthew Feldman, our director, has written a bit about that. It's called doublespeak. 

Another one, which it would be remiss of me not to suggest that people focus on when trying to understand the radical right, is how the internet has really changed the game completely for these actors, both in terms of trying to recruit new adherents, but also in terms of their ability to collaborate transnationally. We did see in the 1980s if we look back historically, a lot of parties trying to emulate the front national, and trying to go after what is called in the political science literature is a Òwinning formulaÓ of what ideological tenants that were needed in order to break through and gain electoral popularity. In the present moment, I guess a lot of people can be exposed to or, or tune into, or stumble upon these ideas on YouTube or if they're searching on Telegram, and to f access some of these ideas. Its really changed both how they kind of recruit and organize and also in terms of their ability to collaborate and also project their propaganda. So, social factors, double-speak, and the online space, I think are really crucial lenses in order to analyze of what's been going on in terms of the radical right today.

AD: I think that last point Will about the ease of radicalization with the internet is so important. I just read a study a few days ago about not just on what people are seeking out, but what content is actually being pushed on them because of how algorithms work. The study was specifically on YouTube, but people can end up in these channels of far right videos and talking points and propaganda. There's been a lot about video games, and there's all of these channels now that people can be exposed to these very violent, racist ideas and there's not a lot of regulation as well, which can really complicate efforts to, as you said, demobilize and de-radicalize people. So I wanted to ask you as someone who's been studying this for 10 years, what are some common misconceptions about the radical right that we see from politicians from mainstream media or even popular culture?

WA: Yeah, thanks for this. One interesting concept that Cas Mudde talked about with distinction, which is quite interesting way of analyzing the whole far-right phenomenon, is trying to move away from seeing it as a pathology and something ÒotherÓ and not related to mainstream society. Particularly when we're thinking about more populist parties and actors, perhaps not the fringe who go for very esoteric forms of ideology (they have slightly different drivers). Away from that ÒotheringÓ and thinking aboutto what extent are some of the ideas and concepts of nativism - dividing between a native out-group and the native in-group and authoritarian policy measures and appeals, and trying to think about how that is perhaps an extension of what's going on in mainstream society, itself in terms of people's attitudinal systems. But also more banal forms of nationalism or Islamophobia that perhaps is a bit more subtle in how it appears. So I think we have to - this is also something which is applied to terrorist actors as well - in how theyÕre covered in the media, which I think we need to perhaps step away from in terms of our conception of the far-right. So that's one area which IÕd like to stress. Cass Mudde says it in a more fancy way. It talks about shifting from this idea of the far right being a normal pathology towards a pathological normalcy, so it's a pathological extension of what's already going on in society and in politics. 

Another thing which I want to stress is that far extremists aren't actually doing that well out of the current pandemic. There's often this notion within popular analyses of the far right that it comes with, and is triggered by, crisis moments, which broadly is true if we look at the broad sweep of history. Actually a lot of these trigger events, again play on fears or panics which are already embedded in society. Going back to that COVID-19 piece, at least in the UK, we haven't really seen the far-right doing that well. They've tried to kind of mobilize on the streets a tiny bit in terms of anti-lockdown protests and some anti-Black Lives Matter. They had one fairly large March, but that was swelled by people who were not really necessarily traditionally aligned with the main movements that were organizing at that time. I think there is, at least at the start of the pandemic, there was a lot of trust in the system, and which is, again, important staving off those on the fringes trying to kind of mobilize on this issue. We shouldn't really see, the signal is the crisis moment, but the noise which is underneath it, is perhaps a bit more interesting in analyzing and trying to be critically aware of and that there isn't this automatic correlation between a crisis moment and the rise in far-right extremism. 
The third point that I had was around this idea that not all far-right extremists are fascists and not all of them are hipsters. So there's often kind of this focus on, the more racial-nationalist part of the part of the spectrum, who tend to be the more neo-Nazi. There's been a shift in coverage to look at what they call kind of hipster fascists to these more Identitarian groups. But I think what's quite unique about far-right extremism when we're f comparing it to other forms of jihadi extremism is just simply the breadth of different flavors of ideology right from those more racial, nationalists, neo-Nazi groups to more ethno-nationalist, Identitarian groups, and then along to the more mainstream culturally nationalist, anti-Islam groups that they mobilize on the same core of nativism, but they do it in very different ways and have very different relations with the mainstream. I think that's what's unique about far-right ideology and far-right extremist movements is simply the breadth.

Another debate - which we're probably have on another podcasts - in terms of policing the boundaries of what we consider Òfar-right extremism - is the extent to which we can include anti-government extremists as well as involuntary incels as being within the broader umbrella of far-right. You can certainly see those anti-government appeals being a really strong element of the more populous aspects of the far right as well as a more toxic form of masculinity so. So it can be quite a bewildering phenomenon, and I think easy reductionist explanations really help to simplify it, but perhaps also ended up missing out a lot of variation that we see. I think having that variation is important in terms of being able to properly analyze this contemporary issue.

AD: I completely agree with you Will, and I think that's a great point to sum up this first podcast is, the far right is very strange, but there's all these different groups that are operating in this space. Some have managed to, as you said earlier, engage in this kind of doublespeak professionalization to make themselves seem more palatable to other right-wing actors. The stereotype still, though, is the neo-Nazi that are sitting in their rooms and on their computer that now these groups actually have become very powerful and really have an ability to influence and be part of mainstream culture, which, as you pointed out in your first misconception, is a real problem that we need to be addressing. How do these groups not only resist mainstream culture, but really feed off existing ideas of race and immigration that are part of our ecosystem? So Will, where can we hear more from you? Are you on Twitter? Do you have anything exciting coming out for our listeners?

WA: People can follow me on twitter, @Willallchorn with two Ls. I try to keep as much fresh stuff from both from CARR but also from the media reporting if there's any kind of developing issues there. And so that's probably the best place to reach me on - most active on Twitter. And so yeah, if you want to drop me a line or talk about any of this further than then Twitter's probably the best place.

AD: Awesome, Will. Thanks for joining us today.

WA: Thanks Augusta.

AD: This has been Right Rising a podcast from the Center for the Analysis the Radical Right, looking forward to next time.