Hello and welcome
to Right Rising, the official podcast
of the Far Right Analysis Network.
I'm your host, Alexander Reed-Ross,
and today on the show we have Dr. Valerio
Alfonso Bruno, whose latest book
with Mara Morini, The Rise of the Brothers
of Italy, Organization, Leadership, and
ideology is in my opinion the best book
that's been published on the subject uh yet
it's a wonderful book uh dr bruno is over
at the universita catholica in milano
and um he works at the polidemos think tank
uh so it's a wonderful to have you here um
and thank you very much for joining the
podcast thank you very much uh alexander for
inviting me it's a pleasure to to be here
with you great um so like i said i i really
enjoyed this book um and uh in my opinion
my take on it is what we're seeing in your
work on uh the fratelli d'italia also called
the fdi or FDE, is a fascinating politics
of individuation. Maloney's leader
-driven politics avoid ambiguities, complications,
and vagueness associated with
weak parliamentary coalitions. They
give her leeway to do international politics by
personal relationships, in which she can
still maintain credible independence,
as with Ursula von der Leyen, and enable
differentiation from the broader European
radical right as represented by Matteo
Salvini in Italy. They offer an economic
conservatism distinct from technocracy and
populism, and they situate Italy as a
partner in the new, quote, geopolitical Europe
discussion emerging from the attenuated
Atlanticist position. And there are other
points that your book raises, but I wanted
to start by clarifying how your book kind
of articulates the individuation process
through which the Fratelli d'Italia
has become a kind of unique and actually
quite strong political player in a country
exhausted by fragile emergency-based
parliamentary coalitions that tend to offer
disappointing results. So here are my
questions. So the first question, when Giorgia
Maloney was elected in 2022, there was a deluge
of news reports in the United States
declaring that a fascist had won the prime
minister spot in Italy. And since then, she's
presented a more moderate administration
that she characterizes as a political
government. But your work also describes a
worrying debate about the normalization both of
fascism and of the far right. We've seen
recent scandals around the historical revision
of the anti-fascist resistance and the
fascist state for instance surrounding fascist
publishers surfacing at important book
fairs so my question is is fascism making a
comeback in italy okay thank you very much
for your for your question um i I will go
straight to the point. No, it's not making
a comeback. I know back to 2022, when
Brothers of Italy won the election,
there was a lot of worries in the media,
public opinion, not just in Italy,
but as you said, a little bit in other
contexts, including our allies, like in the
case of the U.S. So I would say no, it's not
the case, yet there are some aspects where
I would be cautious, especially if we put
what is happening in Italy and the leadership
of Meloni and her party, the role they
have in this government in a broader context.
So if we also look at what's going on in
Germany, where according to the polls, the first
party is a half-day alternative for
Deutschland, and it's a far -right, extreme right
party. And if we look at France, another
big country in Europe, also there, according
to the polls, Rassemblement National
is the first party. So, I mean, if we give a
broader view, a broader perspective, and also
if we account what's going on in the US,
yes, it is really worrying. So, I mean,
it's a problem of context. As concerned, specifically
Italy, I would say Meloni government
has provided to be very stable so far.
Probably nobody was expecting this coalition
to last that long. Probably it may last
up to five years and that would be for
a government in the Republican history of
Italy, like completely record and
unprecedented. so I would say this is already
quite an important news for Italy we
are really not used as a country to be
granted that level of political stability
which is also useful vis-a-vis let's say
just one financial markets so this could
be positive news so yes I would say
Going back to your question about the
comeback of fascism, authoritarian, democratic backsliding, for sure there are
some problems, but I would say it is more
regarding liberal democracies today. their
status it's quite weak it's a problem of of
institutions i think it's not just a
problem of of political actors of movements
of parties that are on the far right extreme
right i will say also the other the other
côté the other side of it is like we as
you know like in these democracies and our
institution we are getting you know like
uh really too much thought when we are
confronting these these movements we are
increasingly tolerating them so i think in these
in the in the next year could be really
like risky uh i guess right yeah so that's
an interesting um place to end it looking
at uh the tolerance of um far-right groups
and organizations. Your text does an
excellent job at developing a multi-level
analysis of political classifications
involving, you know, the Brothers of Italy,
which I think is also interesting to apply
in other countries, other parties. So you look
at the categorizations of fascist or post
-fascist or even a-fascist, which is
non-fascist, I guess. And so when we're
looking at the Fratelli d'Italia today, it's
very complicated because they're not
what they were in 2012, right? They
present different features in foreign
and domestic policies. So that's
another weird thing. What we're
seeing, you know, in Maloney is not
what you're seeing. and their opposition
to populist economic redistribution is also
tempered by things like taxes on bank
profits that they tried to do, which can ultimately
showcase a kind of political acumen that
we're not actually used to seeing very
often. So I think that your book really
locates the post-fascism discourse as one that
scholars really ought to take more seriously.
um so can you discuss your findings about
the post-fascist categorization as it
pertains to and the fratelli d'italia yeah sure um
i would say there is for sure like a
ideological core concerning the the the roots uh
the political card to all of brothers of
italy or fratelli d 'italia which as we know
it comes from a really specific political and
historical tradition of italy after the end
of the second world war with the msi
movimento sociale italiano and so this is for
sure like the roots are in like neo-fascism
but then with the the political history of
italy these kind of movements they they
also had to go through like decades to be
accepted to to try to go into the mainstream
of of italian politics they did you know after
refuge in 1994 when they had to i would
say really normalize and moderate to be
considered like all the other parties and i
would say fratelli italia he goes of course in
in this direction of moderation but at the
same time and this is very peculiar and i
think this is really interesting of of meloni
of ever leadership style but of the the
whole party and they are able to to have at
the same time like moderation so to be
included i mean into the italian mainstream and
the the political system of italy but i mean
also at the european union level and on the
other hand they can also keep the radical
uh part the radical sides there is like in
italy quite controversial policies that have
been you know like working like for for
instance vis-a-vis immigration policy
the model of you know bringing you know some
migrants to to albania this has been looked
at by european union institution with the
curiosity with interest or like next month
in in march in italy there will be a referendum
on the separation of the careers of
the judge that uh the real problem is here
is like really a clash between politics i mean
right-wing politics and on the other hand
the judiciary so was going to have the
upper hand there is a the premierato or uh
temptation to try to to to give more power
to the prime minister of italy and less power
to the parliament so i would say there are
some radical policies but on the other hand
this party brothers of italy is really
an example of on the other end of good and
successful moderation of inclusion and i've
also after the book i'm also working on
a very interesting aspects like from a
symbolic point of view when this when this party
has been undergoing under inclusion under
moderation is try to reactivating like a
reaction or something reactive to to the
moderation to the inclusion how also with like
going back to these symbols like for instance
the the the flame there was a big debate
in italy in the last years what to do with
the flame it's as everybody knows it's like
Like the flame is like really neo-fascist
symbol. And it's always there in the logo of
Fratelli d'Italia and Brothers of Italy.
So, I mean, now it's really integrated in the
system at the domestic level, at the European
Union level. So why don't dismiss this
flame from the logo? Exactly because they
want to show like this is a form of continuity
of identity. And I would say also like
reinforcement of their, you know, like political
identity, like, okay, now we are
integrated, we moderated, we are really included
in the system, but still the flame has
to be there. no matter like even if politicians
from brothers of italy or like journalists
or like senators like liliana segre
they accuse this symbol to be controversial
the the flame is still not there and they will
still there so it's like compensating
on one hand for the moderation to be included
in a broader system to be mainstream but
the other hand you're going to compensate
also So I would say symbolic politics here
is playing a big role. So again, and on this, I guess
a lot has to do with the skills of
Giorgia Meloni. Her leadership has really
been doing an amazing job here. She's able
to keep like moderation and institutionalization
on one hand. On the other hand,
we're keeping, you know, like her identity,
the identity of the party, the roots
of the party is still very strong with,
you know, you can really identify with
a peculiar ideology. Some would say, you
know, fascist, some would say post-fascist,
some would say fully fledged fascist.
yeah it's like also a matter of a big debate
here of opinions but still she's able
to keep you know these two sides in in one
big you know game so on this end she's
proved to be very very skilled yeah i would
say so she keeps some of the fascism but uh
grows out a moderate sort of um uh party
from the core and is still not necessarily
able to abandon the core uh in the same way
perhaps as Gianfranco Feeney was able to
do uh I find it kind of interesting just
the history there um because you talk about
Fuji in 1994 1995 the the uh disillusion of the
mse and the foundation of the alianza
nazionale um because um the the figure like
most responsible i guess for that
transformation from the neo -fascist party into a sort
of national conservative party right
gianfranco finney had been uh the youth leader
um of the youth front i think it was uh
uh of the msc in the 1970s yeah and he
famously clashed with the more violent sort of
ultra right faction during that period um
led by uh pino rauti right uh and became
kind of the leader of uh the moderates and the
more kind of business sort of professional
uh uh outlook more as you write, more
sort of liberal, pro -Europeanist faction of
the MSC and creates the Alianza Nazionale, which Maloney joined. But then because Feeney joined with
Berlusconi, right, in, I think, 2010, um the ultimately
meloni and some of the other more radical
uh you people who had been radical youth in
the mse like ignacio lorusa loruso um
ended up creating the fratelli d'italia so
the fratelli d'italia is like supposed to
have originated from more radical elements
that resisted being subsumed by Berlusconi's
radical right. But a history of
this is really developed in the book.
You talk about it a little bit, David
Broder's book. I think it's
Grandchildren of Mussolini or something like
that. And I think that's a good book.
but but what you you do is sort of um i think
uh a big development from that which
is a more kind of analytical uh work
rather than a sort of historical
narrative um uh so the the fratelli d'italia
though even though it was radical it
sort of branded itself as centrodestra
right away, like the center right. So this
has sort of always been kind of a
contradiction of theirs. And it's always
kind of put them in a different bucket
than the Lega, right? Which is
Matteo Salvini, pretty classic populist radical
right party. So can you talk about how
the the brothers of italy have sort of
distinguished themselves from the populist
radical right yeah i think you you made
a very good point uh tracing the the history
of this party in uh what happened when
uh alianza nazionale led by finney was
joining pdr led by uh the time was led by Silvio
Berlusconi, I think many, including
Giorgia Meloni herself, they were looking
at this project of Gianfranco
Fini as a betrayal of the origins
of the party. I mean, this kind of
dynamics, they can be common if you look
through the story, as you were mentioning,
you know, with the Fugis, Volta di
Fugio, Fugio Tern, for sure, some radical
elements were no more there in Allianza
Nazionale, but they made a comeback with Fratelli
d'Italia, with this leadership. It also
depends on the context. The context today is
different. But I mean, if we compare, for
instance, with France, with the Rassemblement
Nazionale, What it went through
with Marie Le Pen, the normalization
of the party, with the expulsion of
Jean-Marie Le Pen, with the rebranding of
the party from Front National to l'Assemblément
National, with this new leadership also
with Bardella. I mean, parties, they have
this, you know, like internal dynamics, they
have to go through on one hand with the
context, with the country, the international
context as well, but also internal dynamics
in order to find the identity. There is also
always this interplay between the present, the
past, and the future. But for some instance,
you know, like this rebranding that has
been done in the Rassemblement National
under Marie Le Pen, it's very different
to what Giorgia Meloni has been doing with
Fratelli d'Italia. Fratelli d'Italia,
and I go back to your question, What it is
different from other populist radical
parties is that it keeps its ideological
core very, very different from, for instance,
the Salvinist League, which is much
more pragmatic and adapting to the context.
I'm not saying that Fratelli Italia didn't
do some pragmatic, didn't take some
pragmatic dynamics. He did very well, let's
say, at the international level, its behaviour,
but still what makes it different
from Salvini and its party, the league, it's
like there is a real tradition there is a
strong political identity and georgia meloni has
zero willingness to betray this this
identity and also as i said in the earlier
question also the the logo of the party the
symbol it speaks quite clear nobody can really
touch and dismiss the flame and you may say
okay but it's just the symbols i would say
it's not just symbols because you can be
moderating you have been included in you know
like a big system like italy at the european
union level etc etc sure but i mean the
fact that symbolic politics playing a big
role it really means that they don't want you
know like to erase their past they don't
want to dismiss their ideology and don't
misunderstand there are some politicians within
the party they they would like oh but why
we cannot just get rid of the flame it's
the past the the new generation they don't
even know what does the flame means but the
leadership i mean especially giorgio meloni they
say till we will be here the flame will be
there so i mean there is i would say some
consistency there is some coherence from within
the party especially from from the leadership
and this again makes Fratelli Italia
at the European Union level like I
would say quite a model of stability of
consistency with its values even if they come
from a controversial past on the other
hand if you take Salvini his party is
a completely different history And I mean,
it was a meteor for a while back to
2018, 2019, after the government with
Movimento Cinque Stelle, Salvini and his
party, they got very good results at
the election 24, even touching with
polls like 30%. But this was very quick,
you know, like meteoric rise. And on
the other hand, it's completely different.
If you look at Giorgio Meloni, all
the polls since 2022, they are still giving
to Brothers of Italy about 30%, which is
a unicum in Italian history. usually on a
moon phase they don't last long especially
in Italy how come this would be really a good
research question how come that in the case
of this party and Giorgio Meloni they are
still polling at 30% so completely different
I was not surprised that somebody like
Salvini could reach 30% but for me it was
normal that this didn't last long And for
me, it's much a surprise how Meloni
and the Brothers of Italy, they can manage
to keep this party so much appreciated
by the Italians. Right. I mean, it's a
big question. I wonder if Salvini would have
been able to maintain some of his popularity
if he hadn't been embroiled in the oil
scandal and everything. But so far, Maloney
has been able to avoid anything major,
any major scandals like that. And when people
have disrespected her in public, she has
very publicly sort of rebuked them in pretty
strong ways, like in the case of uh the um
friend or associate of the matarella the
uh president of the of italy uh which happened
a few months ago i guess um but so we
have this question which is too big for us
now uh uh why is she still popular when in
in the ever since uh the establishment of
the second or the or the italian republic
uh this has not been normal um even when
it was the christian democracy in the middle
of everything they were cycling through
governments every couple of years um so we have
another question before us as well though uh
which everybody wants to understand which
is how did she get into power in the first
place right because Because the Brothers of Italy was a small party, you know, I mean,
barely above 5%. And then all of a sudden,
they kind of, they became very popular.
I think that your book does a really great job
developing an economic analysis of what
some call the perma crisis that hit Italy
after the financial crisis of 2007, 2008, Which
led to a series of administrations often
caught between being too populist and being
too technocratic. And that led to the infamous
technocratic yellow -green government, which
Salvini was part of from 2018 to 2019,
which sort of had a very marginal technocrat
leading the government who kind of came out of
nowhere. And that was, of course, followed by
the crisis period of the pandemic, which
was another emergency. So how was the Fratelli
d'Italia able to rise in political
stature, particularly by breaking with that
emergency government during the pandemic? yeah
excellent question it took exactly 10 years
for Fratelli d'Italia from its foundation it
was like just a split from Berlusconi's PDL
in late 2012 to rise to the executive power
after the election they won in September
2022 so exactly 10 years and of course it's
not easy to find all you know the reason
but I will say first of all the party and the
leadership they did a very good job to
resist from the the fact that at the beginning
for several years more than several years they
were not performing well at the electoral
level which for a party political party
it's of course you know very bad still they
they resist at the very beginning the flame
of the msc was not in their logo and the
party logo after several years it reappeared
uh at the beginning nobody was really
noticing it then everybody you know like started
like understanding why the flame made a
comeback i would say if i had to find one reason
it really has to do what what you say about
technocracy and to the fact that georgia
meloni identify her government as political
government you may say what does it mean
political government every government is
political true but i mean in italy the peculiarity
is that um citizen they go to vote the
elect uh partisan and representative in the
parliament and then there is you know a
consultation with the approval of the president
of the republic then you have you know your
prime minister but Many, many times in
Italy, let's say the preferences expressed
by the Italians, they were, I would say, a
little bit manipulated. It happened several
times for some issues like, first of all, the
big financial crisis when it arrived in
the European Union with the Eurozone.
In Greece, we had the Troika with the European
Central Bank, the FME, and so all these
austerity measures. So there was some risk
also for Italy and at the time the President
of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano,
he said it's time for Italy to have once
again a technocratic government, this
time was Mario Monti. And then like after
years we had many, many different
governments changing year after year with not
a lot of respect, I would say, for
indication of the people in the polls till of
course to the covid the 19 the pandemic
once again we had a technocratic
government led by former president european
central bank mario draghi so when georgia
meloni say i can do this also i can take
some radical decision in terms of policies
in italy is because i have a clear political
mandate in the sense that it's not technocratic
government citizen voted for my party we
won the election we have a stable political
right-wing bloc so if people they italian
people gave me and trust me with this mandate
with their votes this really has to be a
political government so in this sense as again
would like seems rather obvious but really
not was not obvious in Italy and this explains
I mean a lot the fact that maybe Italian
citizens they were a little bit frustrated
because like this idea even if we go to vote
there's not a lot of meaning because at the
end you know like the establishment like the
institution they are going to to replace our
candidate our leader with somebody that
they prefer like the financial markets or
like the european central bank they are like to
put you know suggest somebody else to
replace at the time for instance wasilio brusconi
right now it's like they're like okay we
voted for this party we voted for this leader
and she's there and i mean okay this like
uh gives like the the idea that our votes our
opinion that we express in the uh the ballot
box in the during the election they really
matter it's not like that we can vote but
after one year our candidate will be replaced
by the president of the thailand republic
or like you know by a new parliament etc etc
sorry a new vote in the parliament so i
mean this gives the idea the people being a little
bit less frustrated you may say but still
in italy less and less people they go to
vote this is also true we have a big problem
with abstentionism in italy i guess it's
pretty much an issue also in other liberal
democracies i would say but still perhaps the
fact that meloni consider herself a government
to be like a political government somehow
it's a way to address this this issue yeah
i mean i i think it's maybe it speaks also
to the individuation uh phenomenon that i was
kind of referring to initially like people
felt that when they voted uh for the center
left or even for you know yellow green or
whatever they were uh they ended up with something
they weren't voting for right they just
kind of their vote sort of dissipated
into the same kind of economic structures, so
maybe they went to vote for the Maloney-led
bloc, which was the Brothers of Italy and
the Lega and Berlusconi's party and a few others,
because they wanted some kind of direct
representation in that kind of way, a singular
form that they hadn't been able to achieve
prior to that that's very interesting and
i think with the the political government
it is it is such as like a weird thing but
you find that sometimes in in italian political
discourse right with just look at the uh
movimento social right uh the the social
movement that wasn't the social movement it
was a political party so why did they call
it a social movement But they were also, they
were trying to develop a mass party, and
they relied very much on, sorry, they relied
very much on the violence of the youth
groups, actually, to establish that sort
of feel of the social movement, even though
they never really got more than 8% of the vote,
as far as I know, on their best showing.
And then when Ordine Nuovo kind of split up
or was dissolved because of the law against
redeveloping the fascist party, they reformed
themselves as the Ordine Nuovo political
movement, right? Right. So why was that, you
know, a political movement when the earlier
paramilitary formation was not a political
movement? Well, it was like a cultural
metapolitic or whatever. I don't know. So you
have these kind of qualifiers that are
always slightly ambiguous and opaque, but,
you know, in certain contexts, they actually
have a lot of meaning. And I think that's
part of the case here. um but uh she also says
i i don't know there's some discourse that
i want to get into in a little bit about
um the idea of post -ideological government as
well but before getting into that i think
um one of the more interesting things
here about your work on melonia's and and the
party itself is is the structure right because
that's part of the organization right
That's part of the whole subtitle of your book.
So I think I'd be remiss not to sort of probe
this a little bit more. So Maloney appears
to be a strong leader, centralizing the power
of the party while avoiding big party
congresses that often lead to the clarification
of different factions. So the FDI still
kind of has this core of the mass party,
but it's also kind of an authoritarian and
leader-based party where you haven't seen,
where I haven't really observed a whole lot
of factional disputes. So how does this compare
to its predecessors, the MSI and the
Alianza Nazionale? And you were talking
about, for the two years, the Popolo della
Libertà, from which it split in 2012 to form
the Brothers of Italy. So how's their
structure unique? Yeah, also a very good
question, very good observation. Here I
may sound like radical or controversial,
but I really think that Fratelli Italia,
Brothers of Italy, without the leadership
of Giorgia Meloni, would be, you
know, like a completely
different creature, beast. Because
differently from Movimento Sociale Italiano,
MSI, or even Alleanza Nazionale,
that already I didn't know the leadership
of Gianfranco Fini, on this Federal
Italia really took a big lesson from
Berlusconi. I mean, the real, the main change
that Berlusconi added to Italian
politics after following 1994 was that his
party, Forza Italia, was a completely
personalized party. So, I mean,
sometimes I even make this kind of lapsus
when I'm talking of Fratelli d
'Italia, I talk of Giorgia Meloni and
Vice Bersa because, and again, I may
sound a little bit, you know, dismissive
of radical, there is no
Fratelli d'Italia without Giorgia Meloni. It could survive,
but would completely go to other kind
of, you know, like percentage,
electoral percentage. I'm not saying
that right now in the panorama
of, like, of Italy, there
cannot be, like, parties, I mean,
with no personalized leadership. If you take,
for instance, on the opposition, the
center-left Partito Democratico, it's really
an example of party that, you know, they
can change leadership. They have leadership
that are quite weak, also right now with
the Eilish line. um so there is a lot of intra
-party democracy in those you know in political
subjects so i'm not saying that the they
are not alive they are there they can perform
also they can win election but the receipt
of of brothers of italia is really focused
on on giorgio meloni on their skills so i I
mean, there is a circle of people. They are
very close to their leadership. They are also
very skilled. I mean, for instance, Crosetto,
the Minister of Defense, or like the
President of the Senato, La Russa, they are also
very, very skilled. The Minister
for Agriculture, Lolo Brigida, is
also very skilled. I mean, they come
from shared common political culture, from
Alliance Nazionale, from MSI. but still i don't
see i may be wrong uh i can be uh proved
wrong but really i could be no future
for this party without the leadership of i
mean a strong future without the leadership
of of of georgia meloni and i guess
these like the pros and cons of many others
like uh right wing uh populist parties but
this also i would say of populist parties
on the left this is like the big contribution
i would say of populism to to politics
is like the personal personalization of
of politics like you really want to uh uh
to give you know like the power to to to
a leader versus the establishment versus the
the elites i mean this comes with pros it's
obvious many are buying from these,
also Brothers of Italy, but it's also coming
with cons. As I said, for instance, Partito Democratico
will be there also without Erich Line, or
is still there after Renzi and D'Alema, just
to say some leaders. I don't see really Praterina Italia to
have a bright future without somebody
like Giorgio Meloni, or unless, you know,
I could go back to like very, very
low, lower electoral consensus as far as
a new leader capable or more capable
could be than Giorgia Meloni, you know,
has been like found. Yeah, I mean, it's
really interesting. I mean, you're talking
about the Democratic Party of Italy.
And I mean, there are pretty clear
factions there, right? There are people
who contest against Schlein. There are
some people who want to focus more on climate
change, some who want to focus more on
industry, some who have more regional loyalties,
some, you know, so that's like, it's
a, there's a open kind of debate, you
know, in the party. But in the Brothers
of Italy, it's her personal direction,
right? So in Italian media, the one non
-Italian political figure that I think is
mentioned the most besides Trump is
Ursula von der Leyen. But I don't think that
95% of people in the United States would
know who she is even. um however her relationship
with uh meloni is kind of always in the
news they're always it's there's always
this kind of tension and anxiety because it
has to do with the how italy is relating to the
european union and to europe um so can you
talk a little bit about von der leyen and
the importance of her relationship with meloni
and vice versa the importance of Maloney's
relationship with her yeah I think what you
said about von der Leyen the the president of
the European Commission this big very very sui
generis bureaucracy that we have at the
European level it's not just bureaucracy
because it's a mix of power it's really
peculiar the status of the European Commission and
for sure as you said there is a very special
relationship between and I'm saying like
I don't want to say like Italy and the
European Commission I want to be like
between von der Leyen and Giorgia Meloni
and I think this is useful on one hand on
Giorgia Meloni but to be able to speak and
to show also to the Italian you know like
cities that look we have a good relationship
with the european institutions uh look they
they understand us if we are talking about a
model an italian model for migration with the
hot spot in albania just few few days ago
on the on the newspaper like they the from the
european union that is like okay you go
home green light we we like this model we
are studying this model maybe we can try to
implement this model of bringing like migrants,
illegal immigrants to third country outside
the European Union, like a model of the
whole European Union. And on the other hand, I think it's also
very useful to von der Leyen to have like a
partner like Meloni to navigate in,
you know, like the complex water of
Brussels, of the European Union. So very easy.
I would say it's a win-win relationship
and I would say it also has to do to
a special relationship that is developing
right now. It's quite evident between
Italy and Germany, between Mertz and
Meloni. right now i think also mercy understood
that it is important also for him to look
at meloni as a possible model if he doesn't
want you know like to be to surrender for
instance like to have the in the in the close
future so it's like how to go to uh to take
this model of meloni which is a little bit
more radical but also into a frame without
going in other kind of far-right politics
let's say afd or like orban so better meloni
model than orban or like afd so could be
a way to to explain it of course for this
special relationship between uh italy and
germany there is like a big question mark it
concerns the future of france because usually
in europe especially in you know, European
Union without the UK. Paris and Berlin,
they've always been like the big, you know,
couple of the Union. So we will see
what will happen in the next
presidential election. I mean, since I remember, there's always like, oh, next this
time is the good time for the
Front National, it's a good time for the Rassemblement National. But for the specific
way, structure of the system, France that
in two turns it really makes you really to
the side between two candidates at the
second round it's really polarized it's not easy
for a radical party like Rassemblement
National to win so they always say this time
is the good time but yeah in case for sure
the And France, led by a president
belonging to l'Assemblée Nationale, would be like
really uncharted water, I would say. And also,
I don't know what would be the perspective
for Italy. But as I said at the
beginning of this episode, I mean, for sure, we
have in the three big countries of the
European Union right now, italy germany and france
at least according to the to the polls the
political polls three radical right or far
-right parties uh leading in the polls in italy
brothers of italy 30 percent in germany
at the a little bit more than than 30 percent
or really like neck to neck with the cdu
and also in france rassemblement national
polling like as a as a first party you may say
these are only political opinion polls, this
is completely true, still I would say it's
quite telling that in the big three counts,
big three democracy of the European Union
the three parties that are first in the,
according to the polls they are all populist
radical right parties Right, yeah, so sort of on the edge Um, so just a few
more questions. Um, so we're talking
about, uh, Fratelli d 'Italia and the way
that they're kind of distinguishing
themselves from, you know, like you were
saying, kind of the, the politics of, of
Orbán and the, uh, Rassemblement
Nacional and, and even, yeah, Salvini, right? in that
kind of way that they are
pro-European. But, you know, also
they're branding as center-right, you
know. So they kind of differentiated
themselves from the
more ideologically mixed five-star
movement also by rejecting the redistributive
economic reforms. but this conservative
approach to economic redistribution also
included an interesting effort to tax bank
profits which was later pared down um uh so can
you talk a little bit about the economic
position of the brothers of italy in relation
to the center-left and the five-star movement
the other non-right the the non-right wing
you know in in it uh yeah i would say that
the the economy is uh really achilles heel
of of italy uh it makes italy very fragile i
mean we have still a huge uh public debt even
with this government the public debt of
italy is increasing uh there is a big debate
going on right now about increasing the the
budget for the fence and it seems uh is you know
it will be increased because of you know
the demands from from trump uh it's a big
debate but complicated so yes this one still
like uh italian economy is is very uh fragile
we are not so productive i would say that some
measures that were taken as you were
mentioning from other political parties in
the past they were the redistributive nature
like i mean as you say the reddit digital in answer
but they were really costly in terms of the
italian public debt, the receipt that
they've been following, okay, the Italian
trying to cut the extra profit of the Italian
banks revealed to be like meteoric and completely
failure, like in one week completely
faded. I think the most interesting tool that
the government of meloni has been trying to to
do rather low profile rather like without
sponsoring too much and i think also there is
a rationale for this is trying to sell italian
public debt not to institutional actors
because these institutional actors most of the
time they are not italian they are foreign
but to italian citizen they're doing
through this like an instrumental tool
it's called btp
valore which there have been already
several a lot of rounds like uh 10 rounds of
it and they're being like italian uh citizen
they they like very much so only if you are
italian citizen like retail you can buy this
if you are institutional you have no access
to to it so you may say what is the the
new wealthy what is the rationale of it because
i think uh giorgetti the italian minister
for finance but also meloni they are really
aware that in the past since as i said the
achilles of italy is the public debt this was
a leverage for like financial market to blame
like governments say that you do this way
or we are gonna like replace you with another
politician true as what we said in the past
like new election or like new round of
consultation of the parliament or through the
institution like through the president of the
italian republic this already happened in
the past so i mean even if you read books from
from from meloni the autobiography or like
other interviews they and i think they're
right in this they they say how we can solve
how can we try to fix this problem for sure
it's not something that you fix overnight
because we are still, of course, very dependent
on foreigners that have been bought our
debt. But if you see the share that is possessed
by foreigners, by big institutions like
big banks, hedge funds, of the Italian public
debt, it's shrinking vis-a-vis the part of
the debt, the Italian public debt that is
possessed by Italians. So, I mean, it can
be still dangerous because the public debt
is still big and still you know but they
may say at least it's in the hands of italian
families so we have debts but it's possessed
by by our families so we can try even
to convince them to reassure them but
what if it's about big banks what is if it's
about you know hedge funds for energy
and they come to and they say say to you
this or like you know like a rating agency
we will down route you this has been down
really low profile but they've been doing to
to push this sort of economic sovereignism
i would say this they received quite uh quite
well still on other aspects the italian
economy still as i said not very efficient not
very productive there is a lot of of bureaucracy
the salaries are very like stay there
back to you know what they were at the beginning
of the 90s so a lot of bad news but i
think this idea to try to own like more of
the share of the time public debt by the
italian families is can be quite a good idea and
also a second point i guess that stability
political stability per se is perceived by
financial markets something positive so if you
said the rating agency of major like rating
you know of them they've been like upgrading
italian like outlook so at least even if the
public debt is still you know very high
these you know like the agency they are they
are considering italy to be like some somehow
more like you know trustful than in
in the past yeah yeah that's so
that part's really interesting as
well yeah Yeah. So your book talks
about how the appearance on the international
level is quite different from the way
that the brothers of Italy appear on the
domestic level, where they have much more kind
of far right approach. And it seems to me
that this approach is kind of a biopolitical
one. They institute policies designed to
encourage childbirth and limit immigration
and things like surrogacy as a way
of growing the native Italian family that
they view as under attack. So it's really
kind of like, you know, a biological approach
to life in Italy. So is that the
main edge of their right
wing politics? Just sort of this kind
of effort to cultivate the Italian population
from the top? I really see your point. I think this
idea is there. It's something
that is shared by, ideologically speaking,
by many parties of the radical right,
of the far right, and not only them, the
demographic decline. So what can we do? Try
to have our couples and family to do more
children, like less taxes for them. or like
in Italy right now, if you have children and
more than one children, they are providing
you with more support. But still, I see it quite complicated to
achieve that. The only possibility,
the real possibility that we have to
contrast the demographic decline is true like
welcoming uh uh immigrants to to our countries
um for sure this idea is as we said is there
seems a little bit uh this biopolitics something
uh from a comeback from uh from the
past from the fascist era i don't think it's
it's really it's more like in the realm of
the of the narrative so like really very very
ideological but um as a feasibility i don't
think you know like uh any possibility to
to work so still we will have to deal one
way or another we like how we want to to face
this problem and i guess there is no real
alternative to like integrating immigrants
to our country. So this is just, you know, like
trying our families, pushing our family to
have more children. Just cannot really
work. Just like a real, as I said,
of narratives. Seems like these
kinds of things happen from the ground up
and trying to impose some kind of, you
know, eugenics policy from the top is is
not really uh uh particularly viable
in the circumstances um but you know this
is my take um so you see the last
question you see the uh brothers of
italy as an ultimate outcome of a
normalization process initiated from the
post-ideological claims of Berlusconi during
the mid-1990s. There's a big
referendum you mentioned already on the
table in Italy about reprogramming the
parliamentary system to transform the country
into a system where the prime minister
has a lot more power, kind of like the
presidentialist, Gaullist fifth republic in
France or the United States imperial
presidency. um so this has always been a dream of
the italian far right and maybe i'm overselling
and maybe i'm i'm saying you know it's
not quite as powerful as you know macron in
france right but uh um that kind of
model has been like a dream of uh people
connected to elements of the atlantic
environment during the 1970s like randolph
opaciardi edgardo sonio and the notorious
liceo jelly um and i don't know i
was wondering if it's possible by presenting
the individuation of the strong leader
mass party against parliamentary
wrangling maloney's uh ideological post
-ideological political government is something
like a prefiguration of that type of major
transformation um will the individuation of
maloney's government contribute to support
for presidentialism and how do you think it will
be emulated by other political parties in
italy or or in the rest of europe you already
talked a little bit about merits so um so
yeah what do you think about that um yeah
also as i was saying before like This government
and especially the leadership of Meloni,
this really typical of, you know, the populist
roots there, there is like insufferance
to constraint, either at the international
level, external level, I would say like
international financial markets, then internally.
So one of the biggest constraints internally
is the judiciary, and there will be a
referendum next month. The other big constraint
is the mixed role of our parliamentary
system, and especially the figure of the
Presidente della Repubblica, which has some really
important power, makes Italy quite unicum
at the international level to put limits to,
it can dissolve, for instance, the chambers
of the parliament. so this like comes a
little bit from the the monarchy of italy when
italy was a monarchy many many years ago so
this is like constraints to a vision of
politics of of like a leadership like the
one of melone or like this kind of of party
so their idea is like we we go to vote we
elect a parliament and clearly a leader it's
not that you know the parliament with a new
vote can can have a new leader after one
year and then another like in five years of
the legislature we have like five six leader
no we want like stability in the same
political stability we express uh like uh the
victory of a party with a clear leader and
the parliament has to be constrained to this
and also the president of the republic
cannot you know like propose or like remove
and do this kind of so it's like they don't
want to have too much constraint so i would
say this design is quite radical because of
the check and balances that all the liberal
democracies their architecture should have
they are put in danger the separation of
the powers because on the as i said on one
hand you want to focus and want to strike
the judiciary on the other hand you want
to strike you know the the prerogative of
the parliament and the prerogative of the
president of the republic. So, I mean, yeah,
it's like you give and present power to
people going like very ultra majoritarian
system. What about the minorities? How they
are respected? What about the check? What
about the balances? So I would even say
it's like strange form of like a hybrid
presidential republic with really no no constraint
so also imagine you if the future about
i'm just speculating we will have like a
president of the republic like ignazo la russo
and then like a premierato like with a
strong like leadership so i mean in a context
like where you have also at international level
like countries where you know the far right
is gaining ground as i said germany and
uh and like uh france i mean in the past
with the role of the u .s you know granting
like to be like really back on a weekend of
liberal democracy around the world this could
be perceived like we are really constrained
into a part of liberal democracy we cannot
go uh i could get rid of this but now with
the us no more you know like uh putting
pressure to allies to behave like this to
move into this pot so no more big international
uh constraint apart perhaps from the the
financial markets i told you this is still big
you know the public debt is still you know
the italians achilles heel but you know i
told you the solution of this economic
sovereign So it's clear that, and this is
very populist of this government, the idea
that there should be no constraint to the will
of the people, either internal than external.
that's all internal, like president,
like Mattarella, but also in the past,
Giorgio Napolitano, they were playing,
of course, a big role in
constraining, you know, parties and government. The judiciary,
they were playing a big role. The media,
they're playing a big role. NGOs,
you may say, what about the
political opposition? Honestly, if PD and Five Star
movements, they are the opposition right now
they are rather weak but I may be prone
to be mistaken maybe in the next election
they may win the problems not really
that they may win they already did in the past
but how long it will take for them to
fade because I'm sure after a while a
coalition between Partido Democrático and Five
Star Movement they will not last long
on the other hand And this Meloni bloc has
proved to be there and to be strong. So,
I mean, the opposition may even win at the
next general election, but how long it
will last? And also, let's still, you know,
again, it's very, very important always
to put this into the context. There is a
context in Europe and not only in Europe where
the radical right, the far right is gaining
ground. they're like getting more shares
of the electorate, they're getting
more normalized, they're getting
more stable so I still see much
more chances for the radical right to
implement their design what they want, so
their designs are like we want to have
less constraint as possible to the will
of the people Yeah, it's unsettling and
you have to wonder I mean, because Trump
is so unpopular in Italy, how are the
people who have supported him still
managing to be popular? And then you also look
at Lega and there's signs of, you know,
there's a big split that happened recently
because people thought that Lega
was too moderate. Um, and, and so maybe
that would, uh, indicate some kind
of fracture in the electorate going into
future elections, um, uh, for the so-called
center-right block. But who knows? I mean,
a lot does rest in these referendums
coming up. And I mean, Italy, the judiciary in
Italy is a really profound sort
of institution. I mean, it is
everywhere, I guess, but I think Italians take particular pride
in the judiciary. And so it would be
interesting to see the electorate come
out and basically take away some of
its independence. But who knows
what can happen? Thank you so much for, you know, I have lots
of other, you know, thoughts and whatnot.
but i want to be you know uh respectful
of your time and and you know it's
getting late over there thank you so much for
joining the podcast do you have any other
thoughts um yeah just one very extremely
uh quick about what you say the the
split in the lega recently uh this
general that was part of the the salvinist
league roberto van naci decide to have his
own political party Futuro Nazionale, I
would say but it is very speculative of
me, can pose a much bigger threat to
Meloni project than Salvini's Lega because
Ruvannacchi really can play on the same
platform original platform of Giorgia Meloni
and Brothers of Italy not like Salvini's
full improvisation It's much more serious
risk. So here it's like Aether, it's completely
dismissed at the beginning and his party's
project disappeared, but he's able to resist
at the beginning for some years and to
build up. but not she can really be uh the
future of right-wing politics in italy uh
unfortunately i will i will say and to pose as i
said much more as a threat as an alternative
either from within the bloc so from lega
but also like much more competitive
alternative from then the current of position so
if i was meloni right now i'll be wary i
would be quite worried about this project
because if you read van natchy he really knows
how what he wants to do his ideas are really
clear like extreme right ideas it's not
like sometimes uh like supporting like technocracy
and european you know like salvini was
doing other times like no against immigration
so very kamaleonic very changing his mind,
it's really consistent. So in this, it's very
similar to Meloni, but it's much more
extreme than Meloni. So I think this could
pose a real threat as an alternative model
to Meloni and much more closer to, let's say,
similar to Urbano. All right. Well,
I mean, and that gives more weight
to the importance of the upcoming
referendum, you know? So, Dr. Valerio,
Alfonso Bruno, thank you so much for
joining the podcast. The book is The
Rise of the Brothers of Italy, Organization,
Leadership, and Ideology with
your co-author, Mara Morini. It's out through
Springer series in electoral politics edited
by Daniel Stockamer and Daphne Halickepullu.
um and uh yeah thanks so much for
joining this has been right rising the
official podcast of the far right analysis
network i'm your host alexander reed ross
and i hope you join us next time thank you
very much alexander