Did History Actually Teach Us Anything? - Episode 20 The Station Nightclub Fire (2003)


Laura: Welcome to "Did History Actually Teach Us Anything?" 
The podcast where we unravel the most well-known tales of calamity, mishap, and unforeseen consequences that have shaped the course of history, and consider whether we've actually learned anything from them all these years later...
In this podcast, we examine the historical events that you may think you know about already and the causes that led to them, be they icebergs or bakers ovens. 
We will consider whether these tragedies could have been avoided, and some of the surprising things we do differently now as a result. 
But this podcast isn't just about dates and events. It's about learning from the past, drawing insights from hindsight, and gaining a deeper appreciation for the complexities of what really happened in these events we think we know so well. 
So get ready to encounter remarkable individuals, pivotal moments and fascinating insights that will make you appreciate health and safety and environmental management as far more than just red tape. 

In this episode, we'll be discussing one of the deadliest nightclub fires in US history - The Station Nightclub Fire in Rhode Island. I'm joined by Sam, one of our health and safety advisors, who is passionate about fire safety. Sam, can you start by telling us what happened that night in February 2003? 

Sam: The Station Nightclub Fire occurred on the 20th February 2003 in West Warwick, Rhode Island in the continental United States of America. The rock band Great White had just begun performing when their pyrotechnics - indoor fireworks - ignited foam soundproofing on the walls and ceiling. In under five minutes, the entire club was engulfed in flames. 100 people died and over 200 were injured.
What made this particularly tragic was how quickly the fire spread and how difficult it became for people to escape.

Laura: Pyrotechnics in a small venue sounds dangerous. Is this normal?

Sam: It shouldn't be dangerous, but unfortunately inadequate oversight of the venue and the event contributed to the fire. The venue had a licensed capacity of 404 on the night but had 458 attendees. Most importantly, the club failed to obtain proper permits for the pyrotechnics display. 
In the U.S., any pyrotechnic display requires permits, inspections, and appropriate safety measures - but these steps had not been taken. 

Laura: You also mentioned foam soundproofing. What role did that play in the fire? 

Sam: This is crucial to understanding how the fire spread so rapidly. The club owners had installed polyurethane foam on the rear wall and ceiling and in the drummer's alcove for sound dampening, but the foam was highly flammable and not fire-retardant. When the pyrotechnics ignited it, the foam acted like petrol and the fire spread up the walls and across the ceiling, covering the dance floor area in less than 30 seconds. Modern building codes in the US require fire-retardant materials, but this foam was essentially a fire accelerant. Later testing found that a sample of this foam exposed to a pyrotechnic device ignited in under 10 seconds, whereas a sample of fire-retardant foam did not ignite when it was exposed to the same pyrotechnic device.

Laura: Sam, can you talk us through the timeline of the fire? 

Sam: Of course, Laura. This is actually quite easy to do as the band were being filmed that night as part of a news report, due to a stampede in another venue a few nights earlier. A lot of what I will detail was caught on camera and detailed in an investigation carried out in 2005, both of which are publicly available for those interested in learning more. 
So, the band took to the stage a little after 11pm, and on the first few notes of their opening number at 11.07pm, the pyrotechnics were ignited and shot sparks into the air and against the walls which were covered in polyurethane foam. 
It took approximately eight seconds for the foam to ignite, and 11 seconds after ignition, the band noticed the flames and the crowd soon began to realise that the fire was not an intentional part of the show.
Within 25 seconds, the flames reached the ceiling on both sides of the platform and the cameraman started to retreat toward the main exit as the fire spread very quickly across the polyurethane foam.
The band stopped playing 30 seconds after the fire had started, and the bulk of the crowd began to evacuate. 
At approximately 41 seconds, the fire alarm sounded, and emergency strobe lights started to flash.
At 60 seconds, the cameraman got through the single internal door and into the exit lobby where smoke could already be seen. At this point, a crush was beginning to develop as the bulk of the patrons tried to leave via the single doorway and into the narrow exit lobby.
At the same time, emergency calls started to come into the emergency dispatch centre.
At 71 seconds, the cameraman exited the double front doors and turned to continue filming, and smoke could be seen streaming out at the top of the doorway.
Inside the club, the fire continued to develop and at about 90 seconds, the thick black smoke layer had dropped to within 300mm (1ft) of the main floor of the nightclub. Less than 100 seconds after ignition, the main front doorway became clogged with occupants trying to exit the main floor, and can be seen in the video stacked one on top of the other, calling for help. Club patrons and staff were breaking windows on the front of the nightclub from inside and outside, and were exiting through the windows. Patrons who had escaped were also attempting to pull people out who had been wedged in the front doorway.
At 11.10pm, flames could be seen near the front door.
Shortly after 11.13pm (five minutes after ignition), the first fire engine arrived and flames were observed extending out of the windows and front doorway, which was still stacked with people trying to escape.
At 11.14pm, Warwick task force was activated to provide an additional 7 engines and ladders and a further 12 rescue units were requested.
At 11.22pm, the fire chief attending initiated the mass casualty plan, and at 11.24pm requested a further 15 rescue units.
At 11.32pm, the area and roof over the bar appeared to collapse, and Kent County Hospital reported that they were overwhelmed with casualties.
At 11.57pm, a portion of the nightclub roof appeared to collapse, and at approximately 12.07am, a further portion of the roof appeared to collapse.
And finally, at approximately 1.00am, the incident commander canceled additional rescue units as all survivors had been transported for treatment. 
The latest time recorded for an occupant escaping from the main bar, through a window, was 4 minutes and 8 seconds; well before the first fire tender arrived on scene.
96 people died at the scene and of those 96, 58 were found in the main entryway.
Most of the fatalities occurred in the moments prior to the arrival of the first emergency services units.
Three more people died within days, followed by an additional death 70 days after the fire, raising the final fatality count to 100. 
More than 200 other victims, many seriously hurt from burns, respiratory insult and physical trauma, were provided emergency care and triaged at the scene, then transported to hospitals in multiple states.

Laura: So, what other deficiencies or factors contributed to the tragedy?

Sam: The Station Nightclub was a single-story, wood-framed building, with a footprint of about 412m². It was originally built in 1946, and changed hands and internal configurations many times in the 57 years up to the night of the fire. Modifications included small additions like raised floors, the small stage and other internal layouts, and portions of it were rebuilt after a car rammed the building, and, ironically, after a previous fire.
The main entrance on the north side of the building had double doors with a short corridor or lobby, leading to a single interior door. In addition to the main entrance, there were three other doors leading directly to the outside of the building - one adjacent to the stage on the west end of the building, a second at the side of the main bar at the east end of the building, both designated fire escape doors, and a third accessed through the kitchen - but this would not have been accessible to patrons. There were also windows along the north side of the building.
In addition to the flexible polyurethane foam that was attached to the walls, foam plastic thermal insulation had been installed in the stud space with no fire-resistant barrier on the interior side of the walls of the drummer's alcove; this contributed to the smoke and heat release from the fire. 
The building did not have sprinklers fitted as the owners claimed an exemption due to the age of the building through a grandfather clause. This meant that the capability to suppress the fire in its early stages was not sufficient. 
Staff had little or no training - bouncers reportedly attempted to stop people exiting via the stage fire exit door, and it was noted that patrons were apparently not instructed to evacuate by staff at the outset of the fire.
The bar side emergency exit was reportedly difficult to open, and some emergency lighting and emergency signage lighting did not work.
The emergency door at the stage didn't swing in the correct direction, and it very quickly became impassable due to its proximity to the stage where the fire originated.
The car park was full, which made it more difficult for the emergency services to get close to the building and increased response times. Although the tour bus was removed during the early minutes of the fire, other vehicles parked near the northeast side (adjacent to the single door bar area exit) in the immediate proximity of the building were exposed to sufficient radiant heat to produce secondary ignitions, requiring extinguishment and producing additional vehicle fire losses from the incident.
And of course, the event was over capacity by over 13%.
When the fire started, hundreds of people rushed toward that single exit leading to the front door, creating a deadly bottleneck. The inner door was simply not wide enough to permit the speedy escape of so many people in the time available.
In summary then, the direct contributors to this large loss of life were found to be the hazardous mix of building contents, the inadequate capability to suppress the fire during its early stage of growth, and the inability of the exits to handle all of the occupants in the short time available for such a fast-growing fire. 
Of course, this is only part of the story. There were many other contributing factors that led to this totally avoidable event.

Laura: How does building safety regulation work in the U.S.? Who's responsible for ensuring venues are safe? 

Sam: Fire safety is primarily regulated at the state and local level. Local fire marshals conduct inspections and enforce building codes which cover things like exit capacity, sprinkler systems, and occupancy limits. However, enforcement can vary significantly between jurisdictions. The Station Nightclub has actually been inspected repeatedly, and critical safety violations such as a non-operational emergency lighting and signage were identified year after year, but these were not adequately addressed.
U.S. fire codes require multiple exits, proper signage, and exit capacity calculations based on occupancy, but the reality unfortunately often falls short of the requirements.

Laura: So, what changes came out of the Station Nightclub Fire? 

Sam: The Station Fire led significant legislative reforms. Many states strengthened their fire codes, particularly regarding flammable material, occupancy limits, and exit requirements. Rhode Island created stricter regulations for pyrotechnics and assembly occupancies. 
There was also increased focus on fire marshal training and inspection frequency. However, implementation varies widely across the thousands of local jurisdictions in the U.S. Specifically, the Rhode Island State Fire Code was changed to require every nightclub in the state with a capacity of more than 150 people to have a sprinkler system installed. 
Within weeks, the National Fire Protection Association committee met to regulate code for "assembly occupancies". Based on this work, Tentative Interim Amendments, or 'TIAs', were issued for the national standard in July 2003. The TIAs required automatic fire sprinklers in all existing nightclubs and similar locations accommodating more than a hundred occupants, and all new locations in the same categories. The TIAs also required additional crowd manager personnel, amongst other things. These TIAs were subsequently incorporated into the 2006 edition of the Life Safety Code, known as NFPA 101, along with additional exit requirements for new nightclub occupancies.

Laura: Was anyone held responsible for the fire? It seems like there should have been, due to all the shortcomings you have detailed. 

Sam: An investigation of the fire by a Rhode Island state grand jury announced indictments against The Station owners Jeffrey and Michael Derderian, and the band's road manager Daniel M. Biechele. The three were each charged with 100 counts of involuntary manslaughter with criminal negligence, and 100 counts of involuntary manslaughter in violation of a misdemeanor.
West Warwick fire marshal Denis Larocque, who had carried out a number of fire safety inspections on the premises, was not charged by the grand jury as a state law prevented charges against fire marshals without proof of bad faith.
The band manager was the first to be tried and, against his lawyer's advice, pleaded guilty to 100 counts of manslaughter in an effort to, in his own words; "bring peace. I want this over with". He received a 15-year sentence, with four years to serve and 11 suspended.
The Derderian brothers changed their initial 'not guilty' pleas to 'no contest', thereby avoiding trial. Michael received 15 years with 4 to serve and 11 suspended plus 3 years probation, and Jeffrey received 500 hours community service. This much lesser sentence was mostly due to his much lesser role in the procurement and installation of the polyurethane foam.
There were also numerous civil cases taken against a variety of defendants including the band's insurance company, the club owners, the State of Rhode Island, the foam manufacturers, another company that sold the foam to the club owners, and to many others. As of 2021, the documentary news show 48 Hours estimated the civil payments made to total $176 million.

Laura: Sam, do you have any final thoughts on what the Station Nightclub Fire teaches us about fire safety? 

Sam: The Station Fire demonstrates how quickly things can go wrong, and how multiple safety failures can combine to result in catastrophic loss. Fire safety is not just about having the right equipment - it also requires proper planning, regular inspections, appropriate materials, staff training, and occupancy management. Most importantly, it shows that fire safety is everyone's responsibility - venue owners, regulators and patrons all play a role in preventing tragedies like this.

Laura: Thanks for joining us on this episode of "Did History Actually Teach Us Anything?". 
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